Bloomberg reveals that there are more than a dozen Facebook employees writing Mark Zuckerberg’s posts or scouring the comments for spammers and trolls. Of course, what that also says is that the emperor of Facebook probably doesn’t use it himself at all. Perhaps you shouldn’t either?
The Chinese government has long been suspected of hiring as many as 2,000,000 people to surreptitiously insert huge numbers of pseudonymous and other deceptive writings into the stream of real social media posts, as if they were the genuine opinions of ordinary people. Many academics, and most journalists and activists, claim that these so-called “50c party” posts vociferously argue for the government’s side in political and policy debates. As we show, this is also true of the vast majority of posts openly accused on social media of being 50c. Yet, almost no systematic empirical evidence exists for this claim, or, more importantly, for the Chinese regime’s strategic objective in pursuing this activity. In the first large scale empirical analysis of this operation, we show how to identify the secretive authors of these posts, the posts written by them, and their content. We estimate that the government fabricates and posts about 448 million social media comments a year. In contrast to prior claims, we show that the Chinese regime’s strategy is to avoid arguing with skeptics of the party and the government, and to not even discuss controversial issues. We infer that the goal of this massive secretive operation is instead to regularly distract the public and change the subject, as most of the these posts involve cheerleading for China, the revolutionary history of the Communist Party, or other symbols of the regime. We discuss how these results fit with what is known about the Chinese censorship program, and suggest how they may change our broader theoretical understanding of “common knowledge” and information control in authoritarian regimes.
This is a previous paper by the same authors.
Eric Claw, a member of the Chrome security team, explains one aspect of why browser security is so hard: if the website can overwrite parts of the screen, how can you trust what you see?
A long, valuable article on Facebook’s approach to privacy. The title says it all.
This looks useful:
The world is awash in bullshit. Politicians are unconstrained by facts. Science is conducted by press release. So-called higher education often rewards bullshit over analytic thought. Startup culture has elevated bullshit to high art. Advertisers wink conspiratorially and invite us to join them in seeing through all the bullshit, then take advantage of our lowered guard to bombard us with second-order bullshit. The majority of administrative activity, whether in private business or the public sphere, often seems to be little more than a sophisticated exercise in the combinatorial reassembly of bullshit.
We’re sick of it. It’s time to do something, and as educators, one constructive thing we know how to do is to teach people. So, the aim of this course is to help students navigate the bullshit-rich modern environment by identifying bullshit, seeing through it, and combatting it with effective analysis and argument.
Our aim in this course is to teach you how to think critically about the data and models that constitute evidence in the social and natural sciences.
Wordfence covers an extremely clever attack initiated when a GMail user clicks on an attachment. A new tab opens up and you are prompted by Gmail to sign in again. You glance at the location bar and you see accounts.google.com in there but it isn’t the domain the text is sent to. If the URL starts data:text/html, the domain name will be at the end not the start of the string.
The Book of Life explains that it’s all down to compound words:
Futterneid [Food-Envy]. That feeling when you’re eating with other people and realise that they’ve ordered something better than you.
Backpfeifengesicht [Slapping-face]. A face that’s begging to be slapped.
Kummerspeck [Sorrow-Fat]. When one is deeply sad, there is simply nothing more consoling to do than to head for the kitchen and eat.
Treppenwitz [Stair-Joke]. In French, Espirit d’escalier. The retort you think of when it is too late.
Schnappsidee [Schnapps-idea]. An idea you had while drunk.
Drachenfutter [Dragon-food]. A gift that one has to offer to one’s spouse to appease their fury for a wrong one has committed.
In April 2010, authorities in Israel began publishing on-line information about house transactions, and in October 2010, they launched a “user-friendly web site.” (Details may be found in the paper). The paper measures the change in measured price dispersion before and after the information was publicly available, and, at minimum, found reductions in dispersion of about 17 percent. The paper takes pains to make sure their result isn’t a function of some shock that happened simultaneously to the release of the information. For example, they show that price dispersion fell less in neighborhoods with well-educated people. This could either reflect that (1) well educated people were better informed about housing markets to begin with, and so got less benefit from the new information or (2) that a greater share of the residuals in well-educated neighborhoods comes from non-measured house characteristics. In either event, the result is consistent with the idea that the information shock is what contributed to the decline in measured price dispersion.
So more information really does seem to produce a more efficient housing market. The policy implication may be that data, in general, should be a public good. Data meet half of Musgrave’s definition of a public good—they are non-rival (one person’s use of a data-set does not detract from another person’s use). And while data are excludable (services such as CoreLogic show this to be true), their creation produces a classical fixed-cost marginal-cost problem. The fixed cost of producing a good dataset is very large; once it is created, the marginal cost of providing the data to users is very low. This suggests that the efficient price of data should be very low.
Currently, data services have something like natural monopolies, with long downward sloping average cost curves. Theory says that this means they are setting prices such that marginal revenue equals marginal costs, instead of setting price equal to marginal cost. All this implies that data are underprovided. Danny and Roni’s work shows that this under-provision has meaningful consequences for the broader economy.